If recent discussions about the possibility of a third world war and the reintroduction of conscription in GB – with potential attempts to include Northern Ireland – has made you feel very uneasy, read on…
Such distressing messages have surged across news outlets and social media, with some MPs urging conscription now. While many of us may fall outside the typical age range for military service, the very real prospect raises genuine concerns for those with children or grandchildren who could be affected. The question of whether conscription could return—and under what circumstances—requires an understanding of its history, the exemptions that existed, Northern Ireland’s unique position, and Ireland’s steadfast neutrality.
It is a sobering thought that if you were Ukranian or Russian right now, this would already be your reality. It is also sobering to think that other European nations would possibly have to match this level of involvement in the event of a war with a Russian aggressor. Russia has called up 300,000+ troops with many young men fleeing the country to avoid mobilisation. In 2024 it introduced a new electronic draft system which prevents men leaving the country once summoned.
Ukraine’s response to the Russian invasion was to introduce Martial Law and general mobilisation. All men, aged 18-60, were banned from leaving the country and by 2023 its military had reportedly 700,000 men. This is not make-believe, but a very harsh reality for the people of both countries. To be complacent about this would be foolish, but exactly how worried should we be? I try to assess this fairly in this post.
The History of Conscription in the UK
During the First World War, the United Kingdom introduced conscription through the Military Service Act of 1916. Initially, this applied to single men aged between 18 and 41, though exemptions were granted for those who were medically unfit, clergymen, teachers, and certain industrial workers. The conscription age was later extended to 51, and although Britain faced significant manpower shortages, conscription was never enforced in Ireland. Widespread opposition made its implementation politically untenable, and resistance to the measure further fuelled Irish nationalist sentiment, contributing to the movement for independence.
However, certain workers in key industries were exempt from the draft because their labour was essential to the war effort. These “reserved occupations” included munitions workers, who produced the weapons and ammunition needed for combat, as well as coal miners, whose work fuelled warships, trains, and factories. Shipbuilders and dock workers were also protected, as the Royal Navy relied on a constant supply of new vessels. Similarly, railway and transport workers were crucial for moving troops and supplies, while farmers and agricultural workers ensured food production remained stable, especially as German U-boats disrupted imports.
By the late 1930s, tensions in Europe had once again made military preparedness a priority. In May 1939, the UK introduced the Military Training Act, marking its first peacetime conscription law. This initially required single men aged 20 and 21 to complete six months of military training but following the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, the National Service (Armed Forces) Act extended this to all men aged 18 to 41.
However, once again exemptions were granted to those in reserved occupations, whose work was deemed essential to the war effort. This included munitions workers, who produced weapons and ammunition, as well as coal miners, steel and ironworkers, and shipbuilders, all of whom played a critical role in maintaining Britain’s military strength. Railway workers, lorry drivers, and dock labourers were also exempt as they were vital for transporting troops, supplies, and equipment. Similarly, farmers, agricultural workers, and anglers were protected from conscription to ensure the nation’s food security, especially as German U-boats again threatened imports.
In WW2 exemptions were also granted on medical and moral grounds. Those deemed physically or mentally unfit were excused from service, while conscientious objectors, who opposed military service for religious or ethical reasons, could appeal to tribunals. If approved, they were often assigned to non-combat roles such as medical services, civil defence, or bomb disposal. Despite these exemptions, many reserved workers were required to remain in their industries under strict wartime regulations, ensuring that Britain could sustain both its military and civilian needs throughout the conflict.
In contrast to the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland was excluded from this mandate.
Why Was Northern Ireland Exempt?
Conscription in Northern Ireland was a politically delicate issue. The UK government recognised that enforcing compulsory service in the region could provoke significant backlash, particularly among the nationalist population. During both world wars, efforts to introduce conscription faced strong resistance, not just from nationalists but also from sections of the unionist community, who feared it could destabilise the region. Instead, Northern Ireland relied on voluntary recruitment, and thousands still joined the British armed forces.
This exemption continued into the post-war period, meaning that when the UK introduced National Service in 1947—a policy requiring all young men to serve in the military for up to two years—Northern Ireland was once again excluded. By contrast, National Service remained a legal obligation in Great Britain until its abolition in 1960.
What about those with Irish passports?
Ireland formally adopted a policy of neutrality during the Second World War. The Irish government under Éamon de Valera remained committed to non-alignment, even refusing to allow British forces to use Irish ports. This stance, while controversial at the time, has shaped Ireland’s approach to international conflicts ever since.
Today, Ireland continues to uphold its policy of military neutrality. While it participates in international peacekeeping missions, particularly under the United Nations, it remains outside formal military alliances such as NATO. This position is protected under the Irish Constitution and reinforced through various EU treaties, including the Lisbon Treaty, which recognises Ireland’s right to remain neutral. Given this long-standing policy, the likelihood of Ireland introducing conscription or being drawn into a global conflict in the same manner as NATO countries is low.
In any event, what is the actual likelihood of World War Three?
The Shadow of 1938: Parallels and Differences
The recent surge in discussions about conscription and global conflict is driven by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. Some historians and analysts have drawn parallels between today’s situation and the late 1930s, when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain pursued a policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany. In 1938, Chamberlain allowed Adolf Hitler to annex the Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia, without military intervention—a move now widely seen as emboldening Germany and setting the stage for the Second World War.
As of March 2025, tensions between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin remain a focal point of global diplomacy. Trump held a high-profile call with Putin to discuss a possible ceasefire, with reports suggesting that negotiations centre around what Ukraine may have to concede for peace. Putin has rejected the ceasefire and NATO allies are watching closely, as Trump’s approach has raised concerns about whether he might end up pushing for a deal that favours Russia more extensively. The broader geopolitical implications of these discussions remain uncertain, as Trump’s relationship with Putin continues to be scrutinised by both U.S. lawmakers and international leaders.
The situation in March 2025 bears some striking similarities to the Munich Agreement of 1938. In 1938, Britain and France, under Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy, allowed Hitler to annex the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in the hope of preventing a larger war—only for Germany to invade the rest of Czechoslovakia months later, proving appeasement a failure. Today, Donald Trump’s negotiations with Vladimir Putin over a possible Ukraine ceasefire raise concerns that he may pressure Ukraine into territorial concessions, mirroring the logic behind Munich. If Ukraine is forced to cede land—such as Donbas or Crimea—in exchange for “peace,” it could embolden Putin to continue expanding his influence, just as Hitler did after Munich.
There are crucial differences to 1938, however. One of the most critical differences between 1938 and 2025 is the existence of NATO. NATOserves as a powerful military deterrent against Russian expansion. In 1938, the League of Nations was a weak, ineffective organisation with no real ability to prevent Hitler’s aggression, whereas NATO is the world’s most powerful military alliance. And even if it is not fully backed by a Trump administration, there is still Britain, France, Germany, and over 30 other nations. The core principle of Article 5—which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all—creates a major risk for Putin if he attempts to invade NATO territory, unlike Hitler, who faced no immediate military consequences for annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia. Additionally, NATO’s rapid deployment forces, nuclear capabilities, and advanced intelligence networks ensure that any Russian aggression beyond Ukraine would be met with overwhelming military resistance. Unlike in 1938, when Hitler could expand unchecked, Russia’s ambitions are constrained by the threat of direct NATO retaliation, forcing Putin to rely on hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, and proxy conflicts instead of outright invasions.
Secondly, unlike Czechoslovakia in 1938, which was forced to surrender without a fight, Ukraine in 2025 is a battle-hardened nation with over three years of experience resisting a full-scale Russian invasion. Ukrainian forces have gained urban combat expertise, mastered trench warfare, and effectively integrated Western military technology, including a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), long-range missiles, and air defence systems. Unlike in 1938, when Britain and France failed to act decisively, Ukraine has received extensive NATO training and equipment, allowing it to maintain strong defensive positions. The psychological and tactical resilience of Ukraine’s military also sets it apart—Kyiv has no illusions about Moscow’s intentions and is prepared to resist, even if external support wavers. While Czechoslovakia was diplomatically isolated in 1938, Ukraine has a unified Western bloc backing its war effort, despiteTrump’s stance on continued U.S. military aid.
Thirdly, another key difference between 1939 and today is the presence of nuclear weapons, which serves as a deterrent against full-scale global war. In 1939, Germany faced no immediate consequences for its invasions, as Britain and France hesitated to act. In 2025, Russia and NATO both possess thousands of nuclear warheads, making direct military conflict a catastrophic risk for all sides. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) ensures that neither Russia nor NATO can escalate beyond a certain threshold without risking total annihilation. Even though Putin has repeatedly issued nuclear threats, he has refrained from using tactical nukes in Ukraine, indicating that deterrence is still effective. This nuclear reality significantly alters global decision-making compared to 1939 when large-scale land invasions were the primary method of military expansion.
Fourthly, the modern global economy is far more interconnected than it was in 1939, making large-scale war far less viable. In the 1930s, Germany and Japan pursued autarkic economic models, meaning war was necessary for resource acquisition. Today, Russia depends on China, India, and Middle Eastern allies to sustain its war economy, while the West relies on economic sanctions rather than direct military intervention to weaken Moscow. Furthermore, China, which plays a stabilising role in today’s economy, has shown reluctance to fully back Russia, as a prolonged war would hurt its global economic interests.
Finally, in 1938 Hitler’s strategy depended upon Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”), which relied on rapid, coordinated attacks using tanks, mechanised infantry, and air power. This, according to experts, would be far less effective in modern warfare due to advances in defensive technology, intelligence, and battlefield awareness. In World War II, nations had limited early warning systems, allowing German forces to quickly break through enemy lines before defences could be organised. Today, however, real-time satellite surveillance, drones, and advanced radar systems would detect large troop movements long before an attack begins, preventing surprise offensives. Additionally, modern air defences, precision-guided artillery (such as HIMARS), and anti-tank weapons would make it extremely difficult for a large, mechanised force to advance significantly behind enemy lines without suffering heavy losses. The presence of nuclear weapons and cyber warfare also fundamentally changes the dynamics, as full-scale invasions risk rapid escalation beyond conventional military means. While Blitzkrieg was highly effective in pre-nuclear, pre-digital warfare, experts suggest it would struggle against modern technology, long-range precision strikes, and superior battlefield intelligence systems.
So, in short, while there are similarities to 1938, such as Western indecision and an expansionist Russia; Ukraine’s military resilience, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence create a fundamentally different landscape from the one that led to World War II.
However, this still does not answer the question: Are We on the Brink of World War 3?
Even though it is different to 1938, no one can know what is in store.
Only a week before WW2 estimates suggest 60% of the UK population expected war, but very few, if anyone, expected a full-scale global conflict – even soon after the war had already started! Most people believed this war would be a regional conflict between Germany and Poland in Eastern Europe. How things can develop is a very scary lesson from history.
History also offers warnings about the dangers of appeasement, but as previously discussed, there are also significant differences between 1938 and the present day. Economically, Russia is also in a different position than Nazi Germany. Hitler’s war machine relied on rapid territorial expansion to sustain itself, whereas Russia’s economy is strained by sanctions and remains dependent on global trade, particularly through its ties to China. I say this with some caution – as in many ways Russia is stronger today than Germany was in 1939 – but economic and strategic constraints mean that while Russia may continue its war in Ukraine, its ability to launch a broader conflict remains limited.
What Comes Next?
For those concerned about the possibility of conscription returning, historical precedent suggests that such measures would only be introduced in extreme circumstances. Modern warfare relies less on large numbers of infantry and more on advanced technology, drones, and cyber capabilities. Any reintroduction of conscription in the UK would require not just a major conflict but also extensive political debate and public consultation. Furthermore, even in Putin’s Russia today, conscripts are technically not supposed to be sent to the frontline (although this reportedly happens). For us, crucially, given Northern Ireland’s historical exemptions, it is also probable that it would once again be excluded by Westminster.
The Republic of Ireland remains committed to neutrality, making it highly unlikely that conscription would be introduced there. However, the broader questions about global security remain. If Western commitments to Ukraine weaken, or if NATO divisions emerge, Russia may see an opportunity to escalate its ambitions. The risk may be a third world war, but this is not necessarily the case. Either way, we are bracing for a prolonged period of instability and conflict at the very least, sadly.
While history does not repeat itself in an exact format, it does nevertheless repeat itself in that human beings continue, time and again, to fight over contested resources leading to mass suffering. Today’s world is shaped by different forces than the 1930s —technology, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence—but the dangers of miscalculation and unchecked aggression remain as relevant as ever. Whether today’s leaders have learned from the mistakes of the past will ultimately determine whether we stumble into a new, deadly, global conflict.
MultifacetedLens 